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Abstract 
 
 
The trustworthiness of a financial audit report rests on the perception of auditor independence. However, 
several factors can affect those perceptions, ultimately affecting market confidence. This study aims at 
providing a deep understanding of auditors‟ perceptions of auditor independence, particularly analysing 
whether and how their perceptions are affected either by the provision of non-audit services, competition, the 
size and tenure of the audit firm or the client‟s financial condition. Qualitative research was held through 
semi-structured interviews. Both the provision of non-audit services and tenure have generated great 
consensus amongst interviewees as impacting auditor independence. Rotation and litigation exposure were 
mainly perceived as enhancement factors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the European Commission reformed the audit market (Quick and 
Schmidt, 2018). Ever since, several measures have been implemented in an attempt to achieve financial stability, with 
greater attention being devoted to the importance of audits in stabilizing the financial system (European Commission, 
2010; Quick and Schmidt, 2018). In addition, audits play an important role on the considerations of investors and 
other stakeholders, as they provide an opinion on the reliability of entities‟ financial statements (ibid). Therefore, by 
strengthening public trust, audits ultimately contribute to the orderly running of markets (European Commission, 
n.d.). 
 
Nevertheless, an audit report is only valuable as long as it comprises trustworthy information (Quick and 
Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). Actually, the relevance of audited information depends on the belief that auditors are 
independent, otherwise the audit opinion will be meaningless (Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Gul, 1989). 
Since the perception of auditor independence is widely accepted to increase auditor credibility (Dopuch et al., 2003), 
independence is required to be the unshakeable “bedrock of the audit environment” (European Commission, 2010, p. 
3). However, several factors have long been suggested to affect perceptions of auditor independence (Gul, 1989). 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine how senior auditors perceive auditors‟ independence, particularly 
analysing whether and how these perceptions are affected by a set of variables. These variables comprise the provision 
of non-audit services, competition, the size and tenure of the audit firm and the client‟s financial condition. Similarly, 
enhancement factors are also addressed.  
 
The following section reviews the main issues believed to impact the perceptions of auditor independence. 
Subsequently, methodology is described, followed by an analysis of the research‟s main findings. Final conclusions are 
then presented. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Auditor Independence 
 
Auditor independence can be defined as the ability to make unbiased judgements and audit decisions, free 
from other parties‟ pressures and influences (Alleyne et al., 2006; Bazerman et al., 1997). Although some authors 
suggest objectivity as an equivalent concept of independence (DeFond et al., 2002), Bartlett (1993, p. 55) simplifies 
this notion by excluding “nonspecific terms” as integrity or objectivity and defining independence as “an unbiased 
mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and financial reporting”. Usually, two related dimensions of 
auditor independence are distinguished, namely, independence in fact and independence in appearance (Alleyne et al., 
2006; Dopuch et al., 2004; Beattie et al., 1999). While the former is an unbiased state of mind that allows the auditor 
to withstand influences that compromise professional judgement, the latter relates to the avoidance of circumstances 
that would lead informed third parties to reasonably conclude that the ability of the auditor to make unbiased 
judgments had been compromised (AICPA, 2014). 
 
Since independence in fact is not directly observable, Dopuch et al., (2003) highlight the impossibility to 
regulate an individual‟s mindset in a timely manner. Instead, regulators must rely on the appearance dimension, 
outlining the importance of public perception (Dopuch et al., 2004). Accordingly, Shockley (1981, p. 785) states that 
“credibility depends ultimately on the perception rather than on the fact of independence” and Holland and Lane 
(2012) reinforce this line of reasoning by recognising auditor independence as a key attribute to establish confidence 
in information provided, and eventually, to accomplish audit quality. Moreover, DeAngelo (1981) argues that audit 
quality is the joint probability that an auditor will both discover a misstatement in the accounting system (conditional 
on perceived auditor‟s competence) and report the known material error (conditional on perceived auditor‟s 
independence) (Quick and Schmidt, 2018; Bell et al., 2015).  
 
2.2 Threats and Enhancement Factors 
 
Prior literature has long sought to identify the factors that may affect users‟ perceptions of auditor 
independence. Nevertheless, it often focuses on potential threats to independence, that is, challenges and sources of 
pressure believed to impair auditor independence, as opposed to factors that enhance public perceptions (Alleyne et 
al., 2006; Umar and Anandarajan, 2004). According to Simunic (1984, p. 679) “any situation which increases the 
probability that an auditor will not truthfully report the results of his audit investigation can be viewed as a threat to 
independence”. Moreover, some assert that auditors cannot always be independent and objective, given the 
relationship they must maintain with their clients in order to obtain appropriate evidence and future revenue (Umar 
and Anandarajan, 2004).Commonly addressed factors believed to impact auditors‟ independence include the degree of 
competition within the audit market, client size and the provision of non-audit services (NAS). Other discussed 
factors comprise, for instance, tenure, the client‟s financial condition and opinion shopping opportunities (Alleyne et 
al., 2006; Beattie et al., 1999; Knapp, 1985; Shockley, 1981). 
 
Nonetheless, several factors are argued to counterbalance threats and to improve auditor independence and 
objectivity as, for instance, reputation concerns and litigation exposure (Lim and Tan, 2008). Additionally, regulatory 
factors such as the existence of audit committees, control over the appointment and remuneration of auditors, 
effective discipline of companies and auditors, and strong enforcement of standards, are argued to promote perceived 
auditor independence (Alleyne et al., 2006; Beattie et al., 1999).  
 
2.2.1 Non-audit Services (NAS) 
 
Among the previously identified factors, the provision of NAS has been one of the most controversial (Gul, 
1989). In fact, there is no consensus in the literature on whether rendering non-audit services influence auditors‟ 
ability to objectively evaluate financial statements (Bartlett, 1993). Although some studies suggest a negative effect on 
auditors‟ independence (Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Beattie et al., 1999; Shockley, 1981), others found 
NAS to positively impact perceived independence (Gul, 1989). Furthermore, other researchers show no evidence or 
inconclusive results (DeFond et al., 2002; Knapp, 1985).The provision of non-audit services to clients raise two main 
concerns. One relates to a strengthened economic bond between auditor and auditee, that is, to an increased financial 
reliance on the client: as an unfavourable opinion can possibly compromise not only audit relationships, but non-audit 
relationships as well, a fear of potentially losing increased revenue may impair auditor independence (Limand Tan, 
2008; Alleyne et al., 2006; DeFond et al., 2002; Bazerman et al., 1997).  
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Additionally, the provision of such services, as consulting, can bias auditors‟ professional judgement as they 
must review their own work. Actually, auditors may be motivated to ignore or conceal errors related to advisory 
services to protect audit services reputation (Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Simunic, 1984; Shockley, 1981). 
 
In contrast, the advocators of auditors rendering NAS argue that the provision of both, audit and non-audit 
services, may improve auditor independence (Dopuch et al., 2004). One possible reasoning follows Goldman and 
Barlev‟s (1974) view which suggests that offering non-routine services enhances auditor singularity and value to the 
client, hence improving auditor‟s ability to resist client pressure and, consequently, to remain independent (Gul, 1989; 
Shockley, 1981). Additionally, since both activities require information about the very same company, knowledge 
spillovers4 may emerge from the joint provision of services, hence increasing audit efficiency and quality (Bell et al., 
2015; Beattie et al., 1999; Simunic, 1984). As advisory services are typically rendered by separate departments (Quick 
and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Gul, 1989),clients benefit from price reductions on the basis of reduced transaction 
costs when acquiring simultaneously NAS from the auditor (Simunic, 1984).Notwithstanding, Quick and Warming-
Rasmussen (2005) postulate that “a lack of independence can neither be justified by efficiency arguments nor by the 
chance of increased effectiveness in the auditing and consulting areas” (p. 153). Furthermore “improved consulting 
services are primarily beneficial for the auditor and the client whereas a lack of independence harms the interests of 
external addressees” (ibid, p. 154). 
 
2.2.2 Competition 
 
An intensively competitive market is usually claimed to increase auditors‟ economic dependence on clients, 
understood as an inducement for auditors to impair their independence and report favourably in order to maintain 
clients (Reynolds and Francis, 2001)as they can easily obtain services from an alternative company (Beattie et al., 1999; 
Gul, 1989). Regardless of the reasons, either simply fees minimization or search for a more acquiescent opinion, 
perceived independence will be at stake as clients‟ incentives or opportunities for replacement increase (Shockley, 
1981). Additionally, competitive environments often lead accounting firms to engage in low-balling, that is to say, to 
accept unprofitable discounted fees in the early years, so to become the new auditor (Quick and Schmidt, 2018; 
Bazerman et al., 1997). However, by lowering fees below audit cost there is an exacerbated pressure to compromise 
their independence, hence, to retaining clients and subsequent payoffs from the investment (Quick and Schmidt, 
2018; Bazerman et al., 1997). 
 
Although empirical results typically support the above-mentioned insights (Knapp, 1985; Shockley, 1981), 
Gul (1989) found environment competition to strengthen perceived auditor independence. One possible explanation 
refers that as competition increases, auditors attempt to create a favourable public image, resembled to impartiality, so 
to retain their clientele (ibid).Finally, alongside audit market competition, auditors also come across accounting firms‟ 
strict expectations, and failure to meet those can often lead to withdrawal (Bazerman et al., 1997). As a result, auditors 
must handle both dimensions of competitiveness, which may negatively impact their independence by allocating 
considerable attention to short-term revenue (ibid). 
 
2.2.3 Audit Firm Size 
 
Earlier research suggests that the size of the audit firm may impact perceived auditor independence. When 
compared to larger-sized audit firms, Shockley (1981) found smaller firms to be perceived as less independent (Gul, 
1989; Umar and Anandarajan, 2004). 
 
As larger firms are expected to maintain a larger clientele, it assures that no particular client is a considerable 
source of firm revenue because the client‟s related fees constitute a smaller fraction of the company‟s total revenue 
(Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). However, for smaller-size firms, the withdrawal of a single client can cause significant 
damages. Actually, considering substantial loss of revenue, other negative outcomes, such as personnel reductions or 
lower compensations, may follow (Reynolds and Francis, 2001).  
 
Furthermore, specific characteristics intrinsic to small firms‟ audit practices, as the propensity to develop 
more personalised services or closer relationships with clients, may induce smaller firms towards a more indulgent and 
favourable report (Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). Therefore, given the size of its portfolio 
of clients, larger firms are perceived as more independent (Reynolds and Francis, 2001). 
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Moreover, following an uncovered lack of independence, the auditor‟s reputation can be damaged, meaning 
that the broader the number of clients, the greater the risk of losing additional clients‟ revenue (Quick and Warming-
Rasmussen, 2005). Hence, a superior number of clients will serve as a warranty against misconducts, and 
consequently, as an incentive to audit independence and quality (ibid). According to DeAngelo (1981, p. 184), “the 
larger the auditor as measured by number of clients, the less incentive the auditor has to behave opportunistically and 
the higher the perceived quality of the audit”. 
 
2.2.4 Tenure 
 
Audit tenure has also been discussed as having a potential impact on auditor independence. In fact, some 
argue that a lengthy association between auditor and client lessens independence (Beattie et al., 1999). This assertion is 
usually explained through the notion that a long audit tenure leads the accounting firm to closely relate to its client‟s 
management interests, hence losing scepticism by relying on their accounting practices (Quick and Schmidt, 2018; 
Shockley, 1981). Furthermore, after a lengthy association, a truly independent stand becomes difficult to take as the 
auditor becomes complacent and depends more on previous work, thus lowering his efforts and disregarding rigorous 
audit procedures (ibid). 
 
On the other hand, opponents of the preceding viewpoint consider mandatory auditor rotation as detrimental 
to independence, i.e., that extended relationships may actually improve auditor independence (Quick and Schmidt, 
2018). They argue that through audit repetition, and a subsequent improved understanding of client‟s operations and 
processes, can easily detect accounting misstatements, thus providing a more efficient and economical service, when 
compared to new appointed auditors (Quick and Schmidt, 2018; Shockley, 1981). Moreover, new auditors are 
expected to lack firm-specific knowledge and heavily rely on management information during initial years (Quick and 
Schmidt, 2018). As a result, clients are anticipated to perceive long serving accounting firms as more valuable, hence 
intensifying auditors‟ ability to resist management pressure and to remain independent (Quick and Schmidt, 2018; 
Shockley, 1981). 
 
Because newly assigned auditors must handle significant knowledge accumulation in a short period of time, 
Bell et al. (2015) find that first-year audits are more often classified as substandard audits (Knapp, 1991). Nevertheless, 
their findings suggest a significant improvement in audit quality afterwards, indicating that recent audit relationships 
may involve a considerable learning curve, which is consistent with the need for initial auditor‟s knowledge 
accumulation. However, their results also corroborate a decline in audit quality as tenure becomes very long. 
 
2.2.5 Financial Condition 
 
Knapp (1985) found auditee‟s financial condition to negatively influence auditor‟s ability to withstand 
management pressure (Beattie et al., 1999). According to the author, the healthier a client‟s financial condition the 
lower the risk of legal exposure. Hence, the accounting firm may be less encouraged to withstand management 
pressure, increasing the client‟s perceived ability to attain its ideal outcome (Knapp, 1985). Actually, given a client‟s 
robust financial condition, the chance of an auditor being held responsible for a controversial decision is remote, thus 
impairing audit firm‟s perceived independence (ibid). Conversely, when the client‟s financial condition is poor, the 
audit outcome is unlikely to correspond to client‟s preferences, as the audit firm fears an increased legal exposure 
(Gul, 1989).  
 
Nonetheless, Gul (1989) found client‟s financial condition to insignificantly affect subjects‟ perceptions. An 
explanation for this finding may be the lack of awareness that auditor‟s independence could be impaired on account 
of the client‟s financial condition. 
 
2.2.6 Opinion Shopping 
 
Opinion shopping is usually understood as the search for an auditor willing to compromise independence and 
sustain a client‟s accounting procedure in order to fulfil intended reporting objectives (Lu, 2006).  
 
Even though some auditor replacements follow sound reasons, others may simply happen with the aim of 
finding a suitable audit opinion (ibid).Lennox‟s (2000) research deduces two main findings: first, auditor switches 
happen more frequently after clients receive modified opinions, and second, auditor replacement increases the 
prospects of a change in audit opinion. Therefore, these conclusions suggest that clients effectively engage in opinion 
shopping practices (ibid). Furthermore, opinion shopping and resulting threats to discharge auditors may impair 
auditor independence, causing material misstatements to deliberately occur (Lu, 2006).  
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Although opinion shopping may be perceived to negatively impact auditor independence, and subsequently, 
audit quality, Lu (2006) shows inconsistent results, i.e., that independence is neither impaired by potential dismissals 
nor by opinion shopping.  
 
In order to mitigate opinion shopping risk, debate has mostly concentrated on mandatory auditor rotation as 
opposed to mandatory auditor retention (ibid). 
 
2.2.7 Auditor Rotation 
 
Auditor rotation has been discussed as a means of enhancing auditor independence (Daniels and Booker, 
2011). Essentially, by restricting the number of consecutive years an audit firm is allowed to assess an auditee‟s 
financial statements, regulators expect to reduce the economic bond between the two, hence decreasing the possible 
impairment of auditor independence (Quick and Schmidt, 2018; Daniels and Booker, 2011). Additionally, the newly 
appointed auditor is expected to employ a “fresh perspective” to auditee‟s financial reporting and to be encouraged to 
reveal possible irregularities of the previous audit firm (Quick and Schmidt, 2018). This approach could be helpful to 
avoid negative effects arising from lengthy auditor tenure as, for instance, complacency, reliance on previous work, 
lack of rigor, and reliance on clients‟ integrity and accounting practices (ibid).  
 
However, an AICPA study found audit failures to be more likely during an auditor‟s initial years auditing a 
specific company, thus sustaining that auditor rotation can intensify the possibility of audit failures, as newly assigned 
auditors possibly lack sufficient understanding of the client‟s business, which is crucial to identify accounting errors 
(Daniels and Booker, 2011). Considering that the initial knowledge accumulation investment cannot be offset within a 
restricted tenure, the auditor‟s willingness to invest in client-specific knowledge decreases (Quick and Schmidt, 
2018).Earlier research primarily suggests that auditor rotation induces improved auditor independence perceptions. 
Quick and Schmidt (2018) found that a lenghty tenure may compromise independence, as auditors are perceived to 
become complacent and depend more on prior audits, resulting in lower effort and rigor. Nonetheless, their results do 
not enhance the importance of client-specific knowledge for perceived audit quality. Likewise,Daniels and Booker 
(2011) found audit firms‟ rotation policies to increase loan officers‟ perceptions of auditor independence, despite not 
impacting their perceptions of audit quality. 
 
2.2.8 Auditor Retention 
 
Whereas auditor rotation rests on replacements, auditor retention aims at preventing audit firms‟ substitution 
for a determined period of time (Lu, 2006). 
 
Although rotating auditors potentially enhance auditor independence perceptions, there is no guarantee that 
the client will not intimidate the audit firm by threatening it with a possible discharge (Quick and Schmidt, 2018). In 
fact, by fearing dismissal before the rotation period ends, auditors can compromise their independence (ibid). As a 
result, the mandatory retention of an auditor within an explicit length of time ensures protection against management 
pressures, thus enhancing auditor independence (ibid). Advocators of mandatory auditor retention support their 
stance in the idea that it diminishes opinion shopping opportunities (Lu, 2006). 
 
Notwithstanding, in a mandatory retention setting, auditors may become excessively confident insofar as it 
concerns their position. Actually, as the client must retain the auditor for a certain length of time, audit firms have 
economic incentives to decrease their efforts (Quick and Schmidt, 2018) as well as to impair their independence, given 
the opportunity to be re-assigned by the auditee (ibid). 
 
2.2.9 Joint Audits 
 
Joint audits can be described as the shared performance of audit work by two different audit firms that jointly 
sign the audit report (Deng et al., 2014).  
 
Several joint audits related characteristics have been appointed as potentially improving perceived auditor 
independence. First, as the audit is performed by two different firms, audit fees must be shared amongst them, 
expectedly reducing the economic bonding it exists in a single auditor setting (Quick and Schmidt, 2018).  
 
Also, it is easily acceptable that two auditors are more prone to withstand management pressure, hence 
increasing the chances of providing an impartial opinion: an improved perception of independence follows the “four-
eyes principle” and related review of the other auditor‟s work (ibid).  
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Lastly, if one of the auditors firms is replaced, joint audit settings also mitigate the newly appointed firm‟s lack 
of client-specific knowledge in the initial years of the engagement (ibid). However, joint audits can negatively 
influence auditor independence perceptions, as cooperative work raises the opportunities for “free-riding” (Quick and 
Schmidt, 2018). Under this circumstance, one of the auditors firms can attempt to take advantage of the other firm‟s 
work, by shirking its responsibilities and by reducing its own effort (ibid). The free riding problem may exacerbate in 
case one of the firms is sensibly larger than the other one: to complete the same amount of work, specifically, given 
the better expertise of the larger firm, the smaller one is naturally expected to take longer to finish the task (Deng et 
al., 2014). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study aims at providing a deeper understanding of auditors‟ perceptions of auditor independence, as well 
as the reasons behind such insights. Therefore, a qualitative research was conducted given its explanatory character 
which, according to Ryan (2002, p. 144), “attempt[s] to explain the reasons for observed accounting practices”, being 
suitable to “understand and explain [...], rather than to produce generalizations” (ibid, p. 144). Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted using an interview script (see Appendix A). In order to guarantee both resembled 
questions were asked and the flexibility to explore new ideas (Ryan, 2002) was kept, the questions were developed 
aiming at understanding whether previously discussed factors are perceived by auditors to impact independence, and 
if so, how would those materialize. The script comprised nine questions, which were further reduced to eight: as the 
interviews phase advanced, questions five and six turn out to merge. Auditors were contacted through personal 
networking, although only one was personally known. Altogether, six auditors (one assistant, two seniors, two 
managers and one partner), belonging to six different audit firms located in Lisbon, Portugal, were interviewed (two 
face-to-face and four through telephone), between October and November 2018. Of those, five either belong or 
belonged to a „Big 4‟ company, and one currently belongs to a medium-size audit firm. Table I presents further 
information regarding interviewees and the gathering of qualitative data. 
 
Table I: Interviews and Interviewees Data 
 
 Date Via Duration Function Company 
Interview 1 30th Oct. Telephone 15 mins. Assistant Big 4 
Interview 2 31st Oct. Face-to-face 35 mins. Manager Deloitte 
Interview 3 31st Oct. Face-to-face 40 mins. Manager Medium Size 
Interview 4 2nd Nov. Telephone 10 mins. Senior PwC 
Interview 5 13th Nov. Telephone 10 mins. Senior PwC 
Interview 6 14th Nov. Telephone 15 mins. Partner KPMG 
 
Every interview was tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed, resulting in nearly 27 pages of data. 
Interviews were then compiled and read several times, so that patterns could be found by meaningfully dissect and 
combine information (Miles and Huberman, 1994). At last, data was reflected upon and findings connected to 
previous literature (ibid).  
 
4. Empirical Study 
 
Auditor independence can be referred to as the ability to make unbiased judgements, free from other parties‟ 
influences (Bazerman et al., 1997). In this regard, interviewee 1 conceptualizes it as the ability to “issue any opinion not 
influenced by future developments, behaviours or any type of opinion”. Interviewee 6 stated that independence is not to have 
“interests in the entities we audit […] and interests can be monetary interests, can be personal, can be knowing someone in core functions in 
those entities”.  
 
Alternatively, as stated by DeFond et al. (2002, p. 1250), “auditor independence is often defined as the 
probability that the auditor will report a discovered breach in the financial reports”. Within this framework, 
interviewee 2 refers that a lack of independence is a matter of omission, further elaborating:“[…] independence it exists, 
i.e., I do my job, no one tells me not to do this or that, I do it and I have evidence (…) the question of independence lies in the omission in 
the opinion, that is, I do not issue an opinion based on all the facts that I have, because there are facts that I have no interest in issuing at 
this moment, so I omit”. 
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Despite being a controversial factor among researchers (Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981), interviewees mainly 
perceived the provision of NAS as detrimental to auditor‟s independence. In fact, some respondents are concerned 
that a conflict of interests may exist when services are provided by the same entity, as the firm can take advantage and 
timethe sale of its services. Even though proponents argue that services are usually rendered in separate departments 
(Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005), interviewee 1 highlights that it is still the same company providing them: 
“Although it seems that there are two companies, one consulting and one auditing, in practice and in everyday life we are talking about the 
same company, the same people who share the same workplace with a common interest, and that is business […] there is almost a conflict 
of interests when it comes to doing business, through the planned sale of products and services”. 
 
Interviewee 2 added that the auditor will take the opportunity to emphasize client‟s weaknesses, so that later 
will recommend toit to contract consulting services: “The auditor will analyse the company in a holistic way, that is, see the 
company as a whole […] and knowing that his company also provides consulting services, will express a need, i.e., will make the company 
feel that there is a need to improve in certain areas”.This underlying conflict is further exacerbated as auditors have to review 
their own work (Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Simunic, 1984; Shockley, 1981). Given that their professional 
judgment can be biased, auditors may hide errors related to other services so to protect the reputation of those (ibid). 
In this regard, interviewees 3 and 4suggest: 
 
“[…] imagine there is restructuring consulting of the client and then any conflict is detected by the audit, and it was the same 
company that said to do so […] there will be a conflict. Perhaps, the [audit] opinion of the same company […] will not be impartial”.
 (Interviewee 3) 
 
“If there is a material misstatement due to professional incompetence, to a poorly provided service, there may be a tendency to 
protect, since it is the same company.(Interviewee 4) 
 
Notwithstanding, interviewee 6 has a slightly different position considering that, nowadays, the provision of 
NAS barely influences independence, and sustaining that “in Portugal, the maximum that can be provided of services is, 
normally, 30% in relation to audit services, as such, 30% has no influence”. However, this interviewee also stresses that, in the 
past, the discrepancy that could exist between services could lead the auditor to face more pressure as there was a 
strengthened economic bond: “In the past, when I could have a client in which auditing was 20 thousand and consulting was 200 
thousand there could be more of a pressure […] there is always more pressure when we depend on a non-audit remuneration”. Auditors‟ 
economic dependence on clients is also argued to increase as competition increases. Since in a competitive market 
client can easily obtain services from an alternative company, auditors can compromise independence so to retain 
subsequent payoffs (Beattie et al., 1999; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). Interviewee 2 clarifies:“From the moment it is a 
business and the client have a large relative weight in the company’s sales volume and knowing that there are other competitors that can 
enter and are anxious to enter, it stands to reason that competition is one of the limiting factors of independence”. Moreover, the search 
for a more acquiescent opinion is simplified as clients‟ incentives and opportunities for replacement expand (Shockley, 
1981). In this respect, interviewee 5 explains how competitive environments can either cause an auditor to 
compromise independence or foster opinion shopping practices: “Competition wants to enter, and the client is not happy with 
the year’s audit. The auditor may turn a blind eye to something so that the client does not change to competition… Sometimes even the 
client may want to change to competition, so that competition turns a blind eye to certain situations.” 
 
On the other hand, interviewee 6 dismisses an impact on independence, although highlighting how 
competitive markets can threaten audit quality:“[…] if they enter into a price war is bad, because it is not possible in face of new 
audit requirements, new standards, a series of additional procedures that have to be done […] it is not possible to carry out a good quality 
audit”. Besides the above-mentioned factors, size has also been a subject of debate in the literature. Researchers usually 
advocate that larger firms are perceived to be more independent than smaller firms: the former often holds a broader 
set of clients, assuring that no individual client is a considerable source of revenue (Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 
2005; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). As a result, a particular client is not considered as essential to a large audit firm as it 
is to a small firm. Interviewees 4 and 5 share this view, suggesting: 
 
“I think smaller companies are more prone to, perhaps, try to protect their position […] by wanting to keep the client and all, the 
work itself may not be done with quality or even independently”. (Interviewee 4)  
 
“[…] small companies […] perhaps will not want to lose [an important client] due to issues related to opinion issuance… Can 
lead them to circumventing some situations so not to lose the client”. (Interviewee 5) 
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Consideration should be given also to the intrinsic characteristics to smaller firms such as the propensity to 
deliver more personalized services or to engage in closer relationships with clients, can induce a lack of independence 
(Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). Despite considering small audit firms more independent than large audit firms, 
interviewee 2 does not neglect the previous line of reasoning, emphasizing: “In smaller companies there is the risk of 
proximity, i.e., between partner and client, and that is a big risk because they are often friends”. Also sustaining that small firms are 
more independent, interviewee 3 stated: “financial scandals were in large companies. As noted, there was no impartiality, no 
independence”. 
 
Conversely to previous analysed factors, auditor rotation has been discussed as a means of enhancing auditor 
independence (Daniels and Booker, 2011). In fact, when questioned about tenure‟s potential impact on auditor 
independence, subjects mostly perceived rotation as a suitable enhancement factor. Interviewees 1 and 2 assert that 
rotation detaches auditor and client, allowing for a greater incentive to express an independent opinion. Further, a 
newly appointed auditor is expected to both apply a “fresh perspective” to the auditing process and to reveal possible 
irregularities of the previous audit firm, hence avoiding negative effects arising from a lengthy tenure, such as 
complacency and reliance on previous work (Quick and Schmidt, 2018): the employment of a new perspective will 
enable to disrupt dependency and to prevent repetitive errors from occurring. Interviewees 1 and 4, respectively, 
sustain: 
 
“Many times it is necessary to have other people looking at the same thing in order to have a different perspective on the issues and 
eventually disrupt a potential […] dependency between the client and the auditor […] if there are shorter terms, this connection ultimately 
fades away: from the moment I know I will not be able to further continue with a client, I have a greater incentive to provide a more 
independent opinion”.(Interviewee 1) 
 
“[…] the reason to change […] is really not to allow repetitive errors and bring a new perspective, and even if there is a lack of 
independence, break with that lack of independence”.(Interviewee 4) 
 
However, recently appointed auditors can lack sufficient knowledge of the client‟s business, which is critical 
to identify accounting misstatements (Daniels and Booker, 2011), and if the investment cannot be offset within the 
limited tenure, the auditor‟s disposition to invest in client-specific knowledge can decrease (Quick and Schmidt, 2018). 
Accordingly, interviewee 6 recognizes both the initial absence of sufficient knowledge, and the investment required to 
provide the newly appointed auditor with sufficient understanding of the client‟s business: 
 
“With audit firm rotation there is an additional cost to both auditors and companies, because companies will have to explain 
everything again when a new auditor comes, and the new auditor is always, in the first, second years, in very large institutions, a big 
investment, so, the auditor is assigned to a client without knowing anything […] Knows public information, but does not know anything 
else”. 
 
Despite rotation‟s potential as an enhancement factor, there is no guarantee that the client will not intimidate 
the auditor with a possible discharge before the rotation period ends (Quick and Schmidt, 2018). Therefore, as audit 
firms can compromise their independence by fearing dismissal, mandatory retention is suggested as a means to ensure 
protection against management pressures (ibid). Interviewee 2 highlights: 
 
“[…] if there is no retention […] [the auditor] knows he can leave every year. He may have a single term of five years but 
knows that if he does not express […] [a particular] opinion, he can leave after one year, so he is always constrained in his opinion. 
Additionally, as auditors’ dismissal threats can also arise from opinion shopping practices, some support mandatory retention so to lessen 
this kind of opportunities (Lu, 2006; Lennox, 2000)”.  
 
In addition, interviewee 4 illustrates: “[A client] used to work with a small auditor that did not persisted much with 
certain aspects, suddenly gets a big company with greater experience, or another kind of tests, whatever the reason, that starts to find some 
errors. That can never be a reason to change […] To guarantee service’s quality, and that the reason to change is a proper reason, and not 
simply because the auditor is being much more annoying than the other, I think it is good to have retention”. 
 
Similarly, some joint audits‟ characteristics, as the “four-eyes principle” and the review of the other auditor‟s 
work, have been suggested as improving audit opinions‟ impartiality (Quick and Schmidt, 2018). Accordingly, 
interviewee 5perceives an improved independence, as auditing “would not be confined to methodologies from the same company”. 
Although assuming “[a joint audit] brings neither gains nor losses”, interviewee 4 further recognizes “it brings two viewpoints”. 
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Conversely, interviewee 3 questions the joint application of methods and cooperative work‟s efficiency, 
considering that “where two work policies are joint, two mentalities, two different entities” it would not work, justifying “I do not 
know a single auditor who speaks well of another auditor’s work, I do not see an auditor reading another’s opinion and saying: Good 
job!”.Interviewee 6 perceives “no great advantage” in joint audits as “[the auditors] will not be doing the same thing, they will end 
up dividing tasks”, and alikeinterviewee 3, acknowledges interpersonal relationships as an additional constraint: 
 
“Parmalat case happened exactly because there were several auditors involved, so the communication between them was not 
fantastic. When we have large groups in which some are here, and others are there, communication turns out not to be as good as if it was 
always the same auditor, the same company”. 
 
Although not establishing a direct connection between an auditee‟s financial condition and an auditor‟s 
independence (Beattie et al., 1999; Knapp, 1985), some interviewees perceived a higher risk of legal exposure - 
associated with poor financial condition (Knapp, 1985) - as likely to enhance auditors‟ independence. Interviewee 2 
states that “[if] the company is subject to huge legal regulation […] the auditor is much more careful […] because the auditor is more 
exposed”. Moreover, and further mentioning reputation concerns, which may arise from litigation exposure, 
interviewees 1 and 4, respectively, pointed out: 
 
“It can affect in the positive sense […] a greater likelihood of facing legal issues in the future can lead to a greater independence 
and transparency in the auditor's work, due to the very consequences that arise from legal exposure. At the end of the day we are always 
talking about a brand reputation issue to the market”.(Interviewee 1)  
 
“[…] if there are legal issues, the ability to remain independent is even greater, I think it increases, because the auditor’s risk is 
higher, the auditor has his company’s name and his own to defend […] in that case independence increases”. (Interviewee 4) 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study sheds light on how auditors perceive auditor independence, clarifying and providing a deeper 
understanding of auditors‟ insights on a set of variables, which have long been discussed in the literature to impact 
independence. Both, the provision of NAS and the tenure of the audit firm have generated great consensus among 
interviewees. These factors were mainly perceived to negatively impact independence. Regarding tenure, auditors 
instinctively mentioned rotation as an enhancement factor. Litigation exposure was also perceived to improve 
independence. Because of the study‟s qualitative character, no statistical generalizations can be made out of it. Besides, 
along with a small sample size, the study attempted to analyse and cover several factors, which may have contributed 
not to extensively address all topics. Nonetheless, the selected method was aligned with the purpose of the research, 
which can further be extended either to exploit other factors or the perceptions of different subjects. Additionally, the 
unavailability of audit companies to cooperate with the investigation has proven to be a challenge. Hence, as data 
gathering relied on personal connections, several limitations followed. First, as a few interviewees were no longer 
auditors, some answers may not reflect recent audit modifications, as respondents may not be aware of existing 
Portuguese legislation. Therefore, some bias may arise when considering results within a national context. Actually, as 
the study was meant to provide a broader perspective, a Portuguese sample may present itself a limitation, as auditors‟ 
perceptions can be influenced by, among other factors, specific national professional standards. 
 
Finally, the study turns out to complement perspectives of professionals both at different career stages and of 
different companies. In this regard, it would also be interesting to investigate whether auditors‟ perceptions of 
independence would differ in accordance with their functions or between small and medium-sized enterprises and 
„Big 4‟ companies. 
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7. Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Interview Script 
 
1. Briefly, what does it mean to you to be independent in auditing? 
2. Do you think the provision of non-audit services, as for instance, consulting services, can influence auditor 
independence? How? 
3. When it comes to competition, in what way do you believe it can affect independence? 
4. In comparison to small firms, do you perceive big audit firms as more independent? Why do you think is that? 
5. What is your opinion towards lengthy audit tenure? In what sense is tenure good or bad? 
6. How do you feel towards auditor rotation? Do you think it can improve independence? 
7. What about auditor retention? Do you think it can influence independence? 
8. In the event of a joint audit, what would you expect regarding independence? 
9. Can you establish a connection between a client‟s financial condition and the ability of the respective auditor to 
remain independent? 
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